The Commission`s agreements can be beneficial as follows: At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), Roosevelt proposed to decide the issues raised in the percentage agreement by the new United Nations. Stalin was appalled because he wanted a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.  The two foreign ministers, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov, negotiated the percentages on 10 and 11 October. The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more importantly, Hungary were changed to 80 percent – other than that, no other country was mentioned. After the description of the Churchill incident, Churchill suggested that the Soviet Union should have 90 per cent influence in Romania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; the UK is expected to have 90 per cent in Greece; And they should each have 50 percent in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Churchill wrote it on a sheet of paper which he pushed back to Stalin, who dragged it and returned it.      The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more importantly, Hungary were changed to 80 percent and Romania to 100 percent. On May 4, 1944, Churchill asked his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, the rhetorical question: ”Will we agree with the communitarianization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?”  Churchill answered his own question by saying that Britain must ”resist communist infusion and invasion.”  The attempt to gain spheres of influence for the Balkans has led Gusev to question whether the Americans would be involved.  Eden assured Gusev that the Americans would support the spheres of influence of the agreement, but on request, the State Department responded firmly that it was not the policy of the United States to conclude such agreements as would violate the Atlantic Charter.  Churchill found himself in a difficult situation and spoke directly to Roosevelt. British historian David Carlton recounts that Winston Churchill proposed the agreement that the United Kingdom and the USSR agreed to divide Europe into spheres of influence, one country being ”predominant” in one area and the other ”predominant” in another.  Churchill harboured at least part of the substance of the agreement the hope that the British could land in Yugoslavia and cross the Ljubljana breach, which would require cooperation with the Red Army, which had already entered Yugoslavia.  Moreover, Churchill`s interest in removing EAM from power interested him in persuading Stalin, whose support for the EAM was so far largely rhetorical, to abandon EAM, because he did not want the disagreements over Greece to be the occasion for an Anglo-Soviet struggle in the Balkans.
 In the British transcript of the conversations, Churchill`s main concern was that the imminent prospect of civil war in Greece could be at the root of an Anglo-Soviet war in which the Soviets supported the EAM and the British.  After the discussion on Poland, Churchill stated that Romania was ”a Russian affair” and that the ceasefire between the Soviet Republic and Romania was ”reasonable and showed a great deal of state art in the interest of general peace in the future”.  Churchill went on to say that ”Britain must be the first Mediterranean power,” which requires having Greece in the British sphere of influence.  Stalin expressed some sympathy for the British who, for much of world War II, were unable to use the Mediterranean because of the risk of maritime and air strikes by Axis powers stationed in Italy, forcing the British to supply their troops to Egypt on the long way around the Cape of Good Hope.  An agreement was quickly reached with Greece and Romania, but Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary became more difficult.  According to Melvyn Leffler, Churchill tried to abandon the percentage agreement after the end of the world war and the visit of Greece.  This was particularly the case, with Churchill and Roosevelt keeping such discretion over the agreement that their successors in power did not know it.  Stalin has an abor